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Abstract
An approach is documented for analyzing probabilistic properties of fault-tolerant distributed systems using
the PRISM model checker.
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1 Introduction
A method for probabilistic analysis of fault-tolerant distributed systems using a probabilistic model checker
is presented. This description includes several example analyses based on the Scalable Processor-Independent
Design for Enhanced Reliability (SPIDER) architecture.
A long history exists in applying probabilistic models to estimate the reliability of redundant systems.
Methods based on Markov chain analysis are prevalent in this context as they enable modeling of state-
dependent stochastic phenomena, which is necessary to represent dynamic system features such as reconﬁg-
uration and component repair. The general principles behind these methods, and many examples of Markov
(and semi-Markov) models of fault-tolerant systems, are presented by Butler and Johnson in [5].
Different software tools have been developed to solve the Markov or semi-Markov chains encountered
when modeling fault-tolerant systems. Geist and Trivedi survey several tools available in the early 1990s and
present the solution techniques that they employ [10]. All these tools attempt to address two fundamental
issues. First, Markov models of fault-tolerant systems can have very large state spaces. This large size is
caused both by the number of components in such systems and by the complex reconﬁguration and diagnosis
strategies fault tolerance often requires. Second, the transition rates encountered in the Markov models can
vary widely in magnitude—since fault-arrival rates are slow but system reconﬁguration is fast—which leads
to difﬁculties for numerical algorithms. The Semi-Markov Unreliability Range Evaluator (SURE) [4] is
dedicated to the analysis of fault-tolerant systems that exhibit low fault rates and fast reconﬁguration. It
relies on approximation theorems to give lower and upper bounds on system reliability. The Symbolic
Hierarchical Automated Reliability and Performance Evaluator (SHARPE) [27] uses hierarchical modeling
to mitigate the state-explosion problem. Simulation-based methods that rely on importance sampling have
also been proposed [9, 30].
More recent tools such as Mo¨bius [8] or the Symbolic Model checking Analyzer for Reliability and
Timing (SMART) [6] are general frameworks for assessing reliability, performance, and other properties of
complex computer systems. They employ sophisticated techniques for compactly representing the model
state space and they use decomposition methods for reducing the analysis cost. These tools are generic and
have been applied to a variety of computer systems and networks. Example applications to fault-tolerant
systems include [3] and [31]. A more complete survey of recent modeling formalisms and analysis tools can
be found in [28].
Typically, the probabilistic analysis of Markovian models focuses on computing transient or steady-state
distributions of a Markov chain. Thus, the previous tools can typically answer questions of the form “what
is the probability of reaching a set of states S?” or “what is the steady-state probability of being in state S?”.
Probabilistic model checkers are a related class of tools that provide a richer language for querying models,
which allows one to consider not just reachability properties but also properties of execution paths in an
underlying Markov model [17]. Properties are expressed in probabilistic temporal logics, most of which
are extensions of the Probabilistic Computational Tree Logic (PCTL) or the Continuous Stochastic Logic
(CSL) introduced in [12] and [2], respectively. As the name indicates, probabilistic model checking is an
extension of traditional, nonprobabilistic model checking to probabilistic and, more generally, quantitative
system properties. For example, a probabilistic model checker can be used to formally verify that a system
model, usually given as a ﬁnite Markov chain or Markov decision process, satisﬁes properties such as “the
failure probability is less than 10−k” or “the probability that component A will fail before component B is
more than p”.
Several probabilistic model checkers are available, including PRISM [15], the Markov Reward Model
Checker (MRMC) [16], the Erlangen-Twente Markov Chain Checker (ETMCC) [13], Ymer [34], and
VESTA [29]. Among these, PRISM is recognized as the leading software tool. It has been continuously
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developed and maintained since 2000, and it has been applied to a wide range of case studies. It can be
downloaded for free at http://www.prismmodelchecker.org/. In this report, we investigate the
use of PRISM to the analysis of high-reliability, fault-tolerant systems.
We give an overview of the PRISM modeling language and logic. We then present several PRISM
models and analysis of a representative high-reliability system—namely, the SPIDER fault-tolerant archi-
tecture [21, 33].
2 PRISM Overview
PRISM is a tool for the formal modeling and veriﬁcation of stochastic systems. The current release (i.e.,
PRISM 3.3.1) supports three types of probabilistic models: discrete-timeMarkov chains (DTMCs), continuous-
time Markov chains (CTMCs), and discrete-time Markov decision processes (MDPs). Support for proba-
bilistic timed automata (PTAs) has been announced for the next release (i.e., PRISM 4.0) [18]. PTAs are
an extension of MDPs with special real-valued variables called clocks that measure time progress. PTAs
are then intended for modeling and analysis of real-time, probabilistic systems. A preliminary version of
PRISM 4.0 is available as a beta release, but all the work and experiments described in this report were
performed using PRISM 3.3.1.
2.1 Modules
A PRISM system is speciﬁed as the composition of one or more elementary systems called modules. Each
module is deﬁned by its state variables, which must all have a ﬁnite type, and by a set of guarded commands
that describes state transitions and the associated probabilities.
Figure 1 shows a PRISM speciﬁcation that deﬁnes a simple fault model. The speciﬁcation starts with
the keyword ctmc to indicate that the model is a continuous-time Markov chain. Alternatively, one can
use the keywords dtmc or mdp for a discrete-time Markov chain or Markov decision process, respectively.
The model then declares three parameters named lambda1, lambda2, and lambda3 that deﬁne three
transition rates. In this particular example, lambda1 is intended to be the transient-fault rate; lambda2 is
the permanent-fault rate; and lambda3 is the recovery rate from transient faults.
The module has a single state variable called state whose value is an integer in the set {0, 1, 2}. The
intended interpretation is that 0 is the fault-free state of the system, 1 is the state after a transient fault, and
2 is the state after a permanent fault. Initially, the system is fault free: state is initialized to 0.
The rest of the module consists of three guarded commands, which deﬁne the transition rates of the
underlying Markov chain. The ﬁrst command is
[fault] (state = 0) -> lambda1: (state’=1) + lambda2: (state’=2);
It deﬁnes the transitions originating from state 0: with rate lambda1 the system moves to state 1 and with
rate lambda2 the system enters state 2. This command is labeled by the identiﬁer fault, which is used
later in specifying rewards. The other two guarded commands in Figure 1 do not have a label. The transition
rates such as lambda are optional. If they are not given in the guarded command, then PRISM will assume
a default rate of 1 (as in the transition from state 2). The Markov chain corresponding to module c1 of
Figure 1 is depicted in Figure 2.
The other parts of the PRISM model in Figure 1 include the deﬁnition of a set of states, identiﬁed by the
label failed, that corresponds to the faulty states of the system (i.e., when state is different from 0).
Also, three rewards are attached to the model. In general, a reward is a numerical quantity that is assigned to
particular states or transitions of the system. In this example, the reward functional is equal to 1 when
state=0 and 0 otherwise. The PRISM logic includes several constructs to express properties of these
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ctmc
const double lambda1; // transient faults
const double lambda2; // permanent faults
const double lambda3; // recovery from transient faults
module c1
state: [0..2] init 0;
[fault] (state = 0) -> lambda1: (state’=1) + lambda2: (state’=2);
[] (state = 1) -> lambda3: (state’=0);
[] (state=2) -> (state’=2);
endmodule
label "failed" = (state=1) | (state=2);
// Rewards: 1 for state 0, 0 in all other states
rewards "functional"
state = 0 : 1;
state != 0: 0;
endrewards
// For computing expected times
rewards "total_time"
true: 1;
endrewards
// For computing number of faults
rewards "num_failures"
[fault] true: 1;
endrewards
Figure 1. Example PRISM Model
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Figure 2. Markov Chain Corresponding to the PRISM Model in Figure 1
reward functions—for example, the expected cumulative reward in a bounded interval [0, t]. In the case of
the functional reward, this is the average fraction of time during which the system is fault free. The
reward function total time can be used in a similar fashion—for example, to deﬁne the expected time to
the ﬁrst failure. As illustrated by num failures, rewards can also be attached to state transitions. In this
case, num failures is equal to 1 every time the transition fault is taken, and to 0 on other transitions.
2.2 Property Speciﬁcation
PRISM uses an extension of PCTL for expressing properties of Markov chains. The logic includes the
traditional Computational Tree Logic (CTL) [7] operators that describe possible execution trees of a state-
transition system and new operators that express probability constraints on these execution trees. The un-
derlying semantics is then based on a probability space deﬁned over the execution traces of a Markov
chain [17, 25, 26].
Figure 3 shows example logical formulas related to the PRISM model deﬁned previously and their
informal interpretation. The ﬁrst ﬁve examples illustrate a very common pattern of queries one makes about
PRISM models. These queries are all of the form
P =? [ path-property ]
Such formulas ask for the probability that the Markov chain’s execution path satisﬁes the given path property.
The path properties are themselves written using the CTL operators G (always), F (eventually), and U (until).
For example, the path property F state=1 means “eventually the system reaches state 1”. It is satisﬁed
by all paths that pass through state 1, and the formula P=? [ F state=1] asks for the probability of
this set of paths.
Formula P=? [G<=10.0 !"failed"] uses a bounded form of the CTL operator G to make a query
about failure probability for a bounded mission time. It uses the label failed deﬁned in Figure 1 to
refer to the faulty states. Property G<=10 !"failed" is satisﬁed by all paths that spend at least 10 time
units in the fault-free state—that is, all paths where the ﬁrst fault occurs after time 10. Hence, formula
P=? [G<=10.0 !"failed] asks for the probability that no fault occurs in the ﬁrst 10 time units of the
system behavior.
Rather than asking PRISM to compute probabilities of interest, one can also assert bounds on the proba-
bility of certain sets of paths and verify with PRISM whether these bounds actually hold. This is illustrated
by the sixth property of Figure 3. The formula P>0.9 [ G<=10.0 (state!=2) ] is true in a state s
of the Markov chain if the set of paths that start from s and do not reach state 2 in the ﬁrst 10 time units has
probability at least 0.9. Then property
"init" => P>0.9 [ G<=10.0 (state!=2) ]
holds for the system if all initial states satisfy the probability constraint.
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// What’s the probability of eventually experiencing a transient fault?
P=? [ F state=1 ]
// What’s the probability of a eventually experiencing a permanent fault?
P=? [ F state=2 ]
// What’s the probability that the first fault is transient?
P=? [ state=0 U state=1 ]
// What’s the probability that the first fault is permanent?
P=? [ state=0 U state=2 ]
// What’s the probability that the system doesn’t fail in a 10 hour run?
P=? [ G<=10.0 !"failed" ]
// Is the probability of no permanent failure at least 0.9
// (in a 10 hour run)?
"init" => P>0.9 [ G<=10.0 (state!=2) ]
// If we run for 10 hours, what’s the expected amount of functional time
R{"functional"} =? [ C<=10.0 ]
// What’s the expected number of failures
R{"num_failures"} =? [ C<=10.0 ]
// What’s the expected time to the first failure
R{"total_time"} =? [ F "failed" ]
Figure 3. Example PRISM Formulas for the Model in Figure 1
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Property Result
P=? [ F state=1 ] 0.90909
P=? [ F state=2 ] 1.00000
P=? [ state=0 U state=1 ] 0.90909
P=? [ state=0 U state=2 ] 0.09091
P=? [ G<=10.0 !"failed" ] 0.99989
"init" => P>0.9 [ G<=10.0 (state!=2) ] true
R{"functional"} =? [ C<=10.0 ] 9.99994
R{"num_failures"} =? [ C<=10.0 ] 1.098× 10−4
R{"total_time"} =? [ F "failed" ] 90909.1
Parameters: lambda1 = 10−5, lambda2 = 10−6, lambda3 = 10
Table 1. Model Checking Results for the Properties in Figure 3
Finally, Figure 3 shows how PRISM can express quantitative properties using reward structures. For
example, formula R{"functional"} =? [ C<= 10.0] asks for the expected cumulated value of
the reward function functional over the ﬁrst 10 time units of a run. More examples of queries and
formulas, and the exact semantics of the PRISM logical operators, are given in the PRISM manual [25].
2.3 The PRISM Tools
To answer the previous queries or check formulas, PRISM can be used either as a command-line tool or
via a graphical user interface. For example, one can check the properties listed in Figure 3 by using the
following command.
prism simple-fault-model.sm simple-continuous.pctl
-const ’lambda1=1e-5,lambda2=1e-6,lambda3=10’
This invokes the prism model checker on the model deﬁned in ﬁle simple-fault-model.sm, for
the set of properties stored in ﬁle simple-continuous.pctl, and with speciﬁc values assigned to the
model parameters lambda1, lambda2, and lambda3.
For each property it evaluates, the tool prints statistics and results, as follows
Model checking: P=? [ F state=1 ]
Model constants: lambda1=0.00001, lambda2=0.000001, lambda3=10
...
Starting iterations...
Jacobi: 2 iterations in 0.00 seconds (average 0.000000, setup 0.00)
Time for model checking: 0.0020 seconds.
Result (probability): 0.9090909090909091
This shows the probability of experiencing a transient failure for the Markov model of Figure 1. Table 1
summarizes the prism results for the properties of Figure 3.
PRISM also provides a graphical user interface (cf. Figure 4). This tool can be used for editing models,
and specifying and verifying properties. More information on this tool and the prism command-line tool
can be found in the PRISM manual [25].
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Figure 4. PRISM Graphical User Interface
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2.4 Other Features of PRISM
In the example so far, we have considered only a PRISM model that consists of a single module. It is much
more common to build PRISM systems by composing several modules. PRISM provides several module-
combination operators, but the default parallel composition appears to be the most common: the modules
perform transitions independently of each other, except that transitions having the same labels must be
synchronized. This is a standard form of asynchronous product of labeled transition systems. The PRISM
semantics document [26] explains how the transition probabilities are combined in such products.
Another useful feature is the ability to deﬁne identical modules by renaming. This allows one to deﬁne
a module B as a copy of another module A, while optionally changing the names of variables, parameters,
or transition labels.
In addition to building systems by combining modules, PRISM allows systems to include global state
variables that can be read and written by all the modules. Some restrictions on the use of such variables
ensure that only one module writes to a global variable at a time.
3 Probabilistic Analysis of SPIDER Using PRISM
We present applications of PRISM to the analysis of the SPIDER fault-tolerant distributed system. The
standard reliability-estimation method for such a system starts with identifying a set of assumptions about
the number and type of faulty components the system is designed to tolerate. Then, overall system reliability
can be established in two steps: prove that the system actually remains functional under the given fault
assumptions and estimate the probability that these assumptions hold.
We ﬁrst describe how this technique can be supported by the PRISM tool, and then we investigate the
application of PRISM to other analysis of SPIDER, including protocol properties.
3.1 SPIDER
SPIDER [22,33] is a distributed computer architecture that provides a communication service for integrated
modular avionics. The system relies on hardware replication, Byzantine-fault-tolerant protocols, and diag-
nosis and reconﬁguration to achieve very high reliability. The core of SPIDER is a Reliable Optical Bus
(ROBUS) whose architecture is shown in Figure 5. ROBUS consists of N bus interface units (BIUs) and
M redundancy management units (RMUs). Each BIU is connected to each RMU via a bidirectional com-
munication link. Each BIU is also connected to a single processing element (PE). The goal of ROBUS is to
provide a highly reliable communication medium to the PEs.
More precisely, ROBUS implements a fault-tolerant clock synchronization algorithm to ensure that all
the fault-free BIUs and RMUs are synchronized. This enables the PEs to access the bus by following
the time-division multiple access (TDMA) strategy. All components in the system agree and enforce a
system-wide communication schedule that prevents bus collisions. The redundant RMUs and BIUs provide
a fault-tolerant consistent broadcast service by means of a Byzantine fault-tolerant voting algorithm. In
addition, BIUs and RMUs implement an online diagnosis protocol to detect and exclude faulty components.
Other important protocols used by ROBUS include a fault-tolerant startup and a reintegration protocol that
enables nodes that are subject to transient failures to rejoin the system. The ROBUS protocols are described
in detail in [33] and [11]. Formal modeling and veriﬁcation of these protocols are presented in a series of
publications, including [21, 23, 24].
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Figure 5. ROBUS Architecture
3.2 Maximal Fault Assumption
ROBUS provides correct service to the PEs under a speciﬁc set of assumptions about the number and severity
of faulty components in the system. Following the hybrid fault model introduced in [32] (see also [23]), we
assume that a BIU or RMU can be in one of the following four states:
• Good: A node is good if it is free of faults.
• Benign: A node is benign if it sends only messages that are manifestly wrong. This means that the
recipients of such messages can accurately recognize that the message is incorrect. Since SPIDER
components can detect that a message is missing, benign nodes includes fail-silent nodes.
• Symmetric: A node is symmetric if it sends the same possibly incorrect message to all recipients, and
the recipients may not detect that the message is incorrect.
• Asymmetric: A node is asymmetric if it may send different, possibly incorrect, messages to each
recipient. As previously, the recipients may not recognize that the message is incorrect.
More reﬁned fault classiﬁcations are possible (e.g., [1]) but we follow this taxonomy since it is used in the
majority of the publications on SPIDER.
Based on this taxonomy, we can partition the BIUs and the RMUs into four sets. Let GB, BB, SB,
and AB denote the sets of good, benign, symmetric, and asymmetric BIUs, respectively. Similarly, let GR,
BR, SR, and AR denote the sets of good, benign, symmetric, and asymmetric RMUs. Then, the SPIDER
protocols provide correct services to the PEs provided the following constraints are satisﬁed [21]:
1. |GB| > |AB|+ |SB|
2. |GR| > |AR|+ |SR|
3. |AR| = 0 or |AB| = 0
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Less formally, SPIDER can tolerate asymmetric components as long as they are all BIUs or all RMUs,
and the system remains functional as long as there are enough good BIUs and RMUs to outvote the faulty
components.
The three conditions above are SPIDER’s maximal fault assumption. They describe the maximal number
and types of faults that SPIDER has been proven to tolerate.
3.3 Reliability Models in PRISM
Our ﬁrst reliability model of SPIDER follows the system architecture. It is given in the appendix (A.1). The
particular instance of SPIDER used in this study consists of three BIUs and three RMUs (i.e., N = M = 3).
We then developed a more general model in which the numbers N and M are parameters. This second model
is also given in the appendix (A.2).
3.3.1 Baseline Model
Our baseline model is a continuous-time Markov chain that closely follows the SPIDER architecture. This
model includes three BIUs and three RMUs, each of them represented as a separate PRISM module. The
PRISM speciﬁcation of BIU1 is described in Figure 6. The modeling follows the fault classiﬁcation pre-
sented previously. It also distinguishes between permanent and transient faults.
The state of a BIU is encoded as two variables: A variable speciﬁes whether the BIU is good, benign,
symmetric, or asymmetric, and a Boolean variable records whether the current fault is permanent or tran-
sient. These two variables are named biu1 state and biu1 permanent in Figure 6. As indicated in
the ﬁgure, the possible error states are represented by integers between 0 and 3.
To model fault occurrences, we use two sets of parameters:
• Transition rates: Two parameters deﬁne the fault-arrival rates for transient and permanent faults.
They are called trans lambda and perm lambda, respectively. A third parameter is the rate of
recovery from transient faults (called repair lambda). All rates are assumed to be measured in
number of faults per hour.
• Probabilities: Three parameters deﬁne the probability that a fault is benign, symmetric, or asymmet-
ric. The ﬁrst two probabilities are given by parameters benign ratio and symmetric ratio
in PRISM, with the third probability deﬁned as
const double asymmetric_ratio = (1 - benign_ratio - symmetric_ratio);
Obviously, the actual values of benign ratio and symmetric ratio must be between 0 and
1, and their sum must also be in the interval [0, 1]. PRISM cannot enforce these constraints, since it
does not know the parameters’ interpretation.1
We have assumed that these probabilities are independent of whether the fault is transient or perma-
nent, but it is easy to adjust the model to a different hypothesis.
The PRISM module then speciﬁes in a straightforward fashion the transitions from fault free to one of the
possible error states. For example, a benign, transient fault occurs with a rate equal to trans lambda
* benign ratio. If a fault is transient, then the BIU returns to the good state with a rate equal to
repair lambda.
1PRISM does not currently support assertions on system parameters, so there is no easy way to encode these constraints in
PRISM.
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// Error states of each component
const int good = 0;
const int benign = 1;
const int symmetric = 2;
const int asymmetric = 3;
// Parameters: fault arrival rates for each component
const double perm_lambda; // permanent faults (e.g., 10ˆ-6)
const double trans_lambda; // transient faults (e.g., 10ˆ-5)
const double repair_lambda; // recovery from transient faults (e.g., 10)
// Fractions of benign/symmetric/asymmetric faults
const double benign_ratio; // 0.5
const double symmetric_ratio; // 0.3
const double asymmetric_ratio = (1 - benign_ratio - symmetric_ratio);
// Fault arrival rates for the BIUs
const double biu_perm_lambda = perm_lambda;
const double biu_trans_lambda = trans_lambda;
const double biu_repair_lambda = repair_lambda;
// Fractions
const double biu_benign = benign_ratio;
const double biu_symmetric = symmetric_ratio;
const double biu_asymmetric = asymmetric_ratio;
// Error model for BIU1
module biu1
biu1_state: [0..3] init good;
biu1_permanent: bool init false;
[] biu1_state = good ->
(biu_perm_lambda * biu_benign): (biu1_state’=benign) &
(biu1_permanent’=true)
+ (biu_perm_lambda * biu_symmetric): (biu1_state’=symmetric) &
(biu1_permanent’=true)
+ (biu_perm_lambda * biu_asymmetric): (biu1_state’=asymmetric) &
(biu1_permanent’=true)
+ (biu_trans_lambda * biu_benign): (biu1_state’=benign) &
(biu1_permanent’=false)
+ (biu_trans_lambda * biu_symmetric): (biu1_state’=symmetric) &
(biu1_permanent’=false)
+ (biu_trans_lambda * biu_asymmetric): (biu1_state’=asymmetric) &
(biu1_permanent’=false);
// recovery from transient faults
[] (!biu1_permanent & biu1_state != good) ->
biu_repair_lambda: (biu1_state’=good) & (biu1_permanent’=false);
endmodule
Figure 6. Baseline PRISM Model: A BIU
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The other components of ROBUS—that is, the other BIUs and the RMUs—are modeled in the exact
same way as BIU1. Their PRISM speciﬁcation is identical to module biu1 of Figure 6, with state variables
and parameters renamed appropriately. The details are shown in the appendix (A.1).
3.3.2 Properties
The remainder of the PRISM model introduces various abbreviations and deﬁnitions to describe SPIDER’s
maximal fault assumption. The model includes three BIUs, so part (1) of the fault assumption states that
either at least two of them are good, or that one of them is good and the other two are benign. It is straight-
forward to express these two conditions in PRISM:
formula two_good_bius =
(biu1_state=good & biu2_state=good)
| (biu1_state=good & biu3_state=good)
| (biu2_state=good & biu3_state=good);
formula one_good_two_benign_bius =
(biu1_state=good & biu2_state=benign & biu3_state=benign)
| (biu1_state=benign & biu2_state=good & biu3_state=benign)
| (biu1_state=benign & biu2_state=benign & biu3_state=good);
Clauses (2) and (3) of the fault assumptions are speciﬁed in a similar way, and the set of states that satisfy
the maximal fault assumption is deﬁned by
label "functional" =
(two_good_bius | one_good_two_benign_bius)
& (two_good_rmus | one_good_two_benign_rmus)
& (no_asymmetric_bius | no_asymmetric_rmus);
Then, the properties we examined include
P1: probability that the system is always functional for a given mission time T . For example, for T = 10
hours, this is written
P=? [ G<=10 "functional" ]
This PRISM query asks for the probability that the maximal fault assumption is satisﬁed at all times
in the interval [0, T ].
P2: The probability of system failure for a mission time of 1 hour is less than a bound p0. For example, if
p0 is 10−9, this is written
"all_good" => P<=1e-9 [ F<=1 !"functional" ]
In this formula, label "all good" denotes the set of system states where all components are good.
P3: The probability of system failure within one hour after a component fails symmetric is less than a
bound p1. For example, with p1 = 10−6,
"one_fault"=>P<=1e-6 [ F<=1 !"functional" ]
This last property allows us to investigate the reliability of a 3×3 ROBUS instance after the symmetric
failure of a single BIU or RMU.2
The complete list of properties that we evaluated with PRISM is given in the appendix (A.1).
2The PRISM model described here does not include the diagnosis and reconﬁguration features of ROBUS, which are intended
to help survive such a component failure. However, the PRISM model can be extended to take diagnosis into account, as done
in [22] or [19].
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Property Parameter Result Run time
P1 T = 5 0.99999999814 0.41 s
P1 T = 10 0.99999999359 0.59 s
P1 T = 100 0.99999945515 4.15 s
P2 p0 = 10−8 true 0.28 s
P2 p0 = 10−9 true 0.29 s
P2 p0 = 10−10 false 0.29 s
P3 p1 = 10−3 true 0.29 s
P3 p1 = 10−4 true 0.29 s
P3 p1 = 10−5 false 0.28 s
P3 p1 = 10−6 false 0.28 s
P3 p1 = 10−7 false 0.31 s
Table 2. Example Analysis Results (3 BIUs, 3 RMUs)
3.3.3 Analysis Results
Table 2 shows the results and the runtime of the PRISM model checker on different instances of properties
P1 to P3. This experiment was run on a 64bit Intel Core 2 computer, with 4 GB RAM, and running Linux 2.6
(Ubuntu 8.04). All the analysis was done using PRISM’s default settings. Memory consumption was not
very large in this example, so we do not include memory usage data in the table. We used the following
model parameters:
• Rates: trans lambda = 10−5, perm lambda = 10−5, repair lambda = 10
• Probabilities: benign ratio = 0.5, symmetric ratio = 0.3
As can be seen from the table, the model checker is fast in this example. The results are as one would expect.
There is enough redundancy in this ROBUS instance to achieve very high reliability, of the order of 10−9
system failures per hour. Reliability decreases signiﬁcantly if one RMU or BIU suffers a (nondiagnosed)
symmetric fault.
It is easy to extend the PRISM model to larger versions of ROBUS by adding more copies of the BIU
and RMU modules. Tables 3 and 4 show experimental results for a 4 × 3 instance (4 BIUs and 3 RMUs),
and for a 4 × 4 instance. The rate and probability parameters were set as in the previous experiment.
On these examples, one observes a signiﬁcant increase in the model checker’s runtime. This is caused by
the well-known state-explosion problem, as the number of states in the PRISM model (and the Markov
chain) grows exponentially with the number of system modules. PRISM employs data structures based on
decision diagrams [14] and sparse matrix representations, to attempt to store the Markov chain compactly,
but scalability to systems with a large number of modules remains an issue.
The model checker also uses iterative methods to compute transient probability distributions, and one
observes that the number of iterations required increases with the number of modules. An increase in the
number of iterations also explains why evaluating property P1 for T = 100 takes much longer than for
T = 10 or T = 5.
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Property Parameter Result Run time
P1 T = 5 0.99999999838 8.99 s
P1 T = 10 0.99999999443 14.56 s
P1 T = 100 0.99999952577 98.90 s
P2 p0 = 10−8 true 5.318 s
P2 p0 = 10−9 true 5.314 s
P2 p0 = 10−10 false 5.298 s
P3 p1 = 10−3 true 5.315 s
P3 p1 = 10−4 true 5.32 s
P3 p1 = 10−5 false 5.317 s
P3 p1 = 10−6 false 5.34 s
P3 p1 = 10−7 false 5.318 s
Table 3. Experiment: 4 BIUs and 3 RMUs
Property Parameter Result Run time
P1 T = 5 0.99999999861 59.09 s
P1 T = 10 0.99999999520 103.03 s
P1 T = 100 0.99999959193 732.9148 s
P2 p0 = 10−8 true 33.057 s
P2 p0 = 10−9 true 33.052 s
P2 p0 = 10−10 false 33.037 s
P3 p1 = 10−3 true 33.042 s
P3 p1 = 10−4 true 33.074 s
P3 p1 = 10−5 false 33.045 s
P3 p1 = 10−6 false 33.048 s
P3 p1 = 10−7 false 33.077 s
Table 4. Experiment: 4 BIUs and 4 RMUs
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module spider_bius
good_bius: [0..N] init N;
benign_transient_bius: [0..N] init 0;
symmetric_transient_bius: [0..N] init 0;
asymmetric_transient_bius: [0..N] init 0;
benign_permanent_bius: [0..N] init 0;
symmetric_permanent_bius: [0..N] init 0;
asymmetric_permanent_bius: [0..N] init 0;
[] good_bius>0 &
benign_transient_bius<N & benign_permanent_bius<N &
symmetric_transient_bius<N & symmetric_permanent_bius<N &
asymmetric_transient_bius<N & asymmetric_permanent_bius<N
->
(biu_trans_lambda * good_bius * biu_benign) :
(good_bius’=good_bius-1) &
(benign_transient_bius’= benign_transient_bius+1)
+ (biu_trans_lambda * good_bius * biu_symmetric) :
(good_bius’=good_bius-1) &
(symmetric_transient_bius’= symmetric_transient_bius+1)
...
+ (biu_perm_lambda * good_bius * biu_asymmetric) :
(good_bius’=good_bius-1) &
(asymmetric_permanent_bius’=asymmetric_permanent_bius+1);
[] (benign_transient_bius>0 & good_bius<N) ->
(biu_repair_lambda * benign_transient_bius) :
(good_bius’=good_bius+1) &
(benign_transient_bius’=benign_transient_bius-1);
...
endmodule
Figure 7. Revised Model for N BIUs
3.3.4 Revised Model
Rather than representing each component of the system as a separate PRISM module, a more traditional
approach is to count the number of BIUs and RMUs in each fault class (cf. [5] for example). This modeling
method takes advantage of the symmetries present in SPIDER to reduce the number of states in the Markov
chain and increase scalability. We describe how such a model can be constructed and analyzed with PRISM.
As previously, the PRISM system is parameterized by fault rates and by the probabilities of each type of
fault. In addition, this new model is parameterized by N and M—that is, the number of BIUs and RMUs,
respectively. The system consists of two similar modules; one describes the set of BIUs and the other models
the RMU faults. The BIU model is sketched in Figure 7.
This module has seven state variables with values in the interval [0, N ]. Variable good bius is the
number of good BIUs, benign transient bius counts the number of BIUs that have suffered a benign,
transient fault, and so forth. Then, a fault can occur as long as the number of good BIUs is non-zero, and the
effect of a fault is to decrement good bius and increment one of the other counters. The rate for a fault
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type is the product of the fault arrival rate, the probability of the fault type, and the number of good BIUs.
For example, the rate of asymmetric, permanent faults is given by
biu_perm_lambda * good_bius * biu_asymmetric
as shown in Figure 7. The PRISM model then includes one probabilistic transition to model the occurrence
of faults. For technical reasons, the guard of this transition is the conjunction
good_bius>0 &
benign_transient_bius<N & benign_permanent_bius<N &
symmetric_transient_bius<N & symmetric_permanent_bius<N &
asymmetric_transient_bius<N & asymmetric_permanent_bius<N
Intuitively, the constraint good bius>0 should be sufﬁcient: faults can occur as long as there are non-
faulty BIUs. But PRISM requires additional constraints such as benign transient bius<N for type
checking. Without this constraint, it is not possible to increment benign transient bius since this
variable’s value must be in the interval [0, N ]. Adding such constraints does not change the underlying
Markov chain, as all states of the chain satisfy the following invariant
good_bius + benign_transient_bius + benign_permanent_bius +
symmetric_transient_bius + symmetric_permanent_bius +
asymmetric_transient_bius + asymmetric_permanent_bius = N.
Recovery from transient faults is modeled in a similar fashion, as shown in Figure 7.
The fault model for the set of RMUs is identical to the BIU model (cf. the appendix [A.2]), and the
maximal fault assumption is speciﬁed as shown in Figure 8.
We analyzed the same properties as previously using this revised model. The exact PRISM formulas
used in this study are listed in the appendix (A.2). Since the model is now parameterized by N and M , we
can ask PRISM to check these properties for different instances of ROBUS, by giving ranges of values for
N and M (see [25] for details).
Table 5 shows the runtimes and results of PRISM veriﬁcation of property P1 for different ROBUS
instances, where N varies from 3 to 15 and M from 3 to 5, and for different values of the mission time T .
In this experiment, the rates and fault probability parameters were set as in the previous section:
• Rates: trans lambda = 10−5, perm lambda = 10−5, repair lambda = 10
• Probabilities: benign ratio = 0.5, symmetric ratio = 0.3
As expected, this revised model is much more scalable than the previous model and can be used to analyze
much larger instances of SPIDER. One can also observe that for the chosen fault rates, this model predicts
that maximal reliability is achieved with about ﬁve RMUs and BIUs. With more components, the system
reliability decreases slightly. This can be explained by the fact that SPIDER cannot tolerate Byzantine
failures in both RMUs and BIUs, and with more system components, the probability that a least one RMU
and one BIU are asymmetric increases.3
3.4 Protocol Models in PRISM
A tool such as PRISM has been applied to the veriﬁcation of randomized leader-election algorithms and
other distributed protocols. Here, we describe an attempt to model one of SPIDER’s protocols and analyze
it with PRISM.
3This phenomenon may be more pronounced in this model than in real SPIDER implementations, since component diagnosis
and reconﬁguration are not modeled.
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formula symmetric_bius =
symmetric_transient_bius+symmetric_permanent_bius;
formula asymmetric_bius =
asymmetric_transient_bius+asymmetric_permanent_bius;
formula bad_bius = symmetric_bius + asymmetric_bius;
formula symmetric_rmus =
symmetric_transient_rmus+symmetric_permanent_rmus;
formula asymmetric_rmus =
asymmetric_transient_rmus+asymmetric_permanent_rmus;
formula bad_rmus = symmetric_rmus + asymmetric_rmus;
//
// Maximal fault assumption:
// - number of good BIUs > number of bad BIUs
// - number of good RMUs > number of bad RMUs
// - no asymmetric BIU or no asymmetric RMU
//
label "functional" =
(good_bius > bad_bius) & (good_rmus > bad_rmus)
& (asymmetric_bius = 0 | asymmetric_rmus = 0);
Figure 8. Maximal Fault Assumption in PRISM
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T = 5 T = 10 T = 100
M N Result Time Result Time Result Time
3 3 0.999999994380 0.023 s 0.999999985032 0.021 s 0.999999360021 0.047 s
3 4 0.999999995108 0.051 s 0.999999986972 0.052 s 0.999999442968 0.135 s
3 5 0.999999996704 0.107 s 0.999999991222 0.114 s 0.999999624638 0.334 s
3 6 0.999999996565 0.205 s 0.999999990853 0.223 s 0.999999608883 0.731 s
3 7 0.999999996427 0.396 s 0.999999990484 0.444 s 0.999999593130 1.543 s
3 8 0.999999996288 0.886 s 0.999999990114 1.006 s 0.999999577341 3.561 s
3 9 0.999999996149 1.956 s 0.999999989745 2.281 s 0.999999561553 9.076 s
3 10 0.999999996010 3.075 s 0.999999989375 3.693 s 0.999999545767 15.215 s
3 11 0.999999995872 4.539 s 0.999999989005 5.521 s 0.999999529981 23.911 s
3 12 0.999999995733 6.858 s 0.999999988636 8.422 s 0.999999514197 37.450 s
3 13 0.999999995594 10.021 s 0.999999988266 12.343 s 0.999999498414 57.240 s
3 14 0.999999995455 14.194 s 0.999999987897 17.565 s 0.999999482633 83.052 s
3 15 0.999999995316 19.949 s 0.999999987527 24.896 s 0.999999466852 121.887 s
4 3 0.999999995108 0.067 s 0.999999986973 0.055 s 0.999999442968 0.137 s
4 4 0.999999995791 0.142 s 0.999999988790 0.129 s 0.999999520647 0.377 s
4 5 0.999999997340 0.290 s 0.999999992916 0.290 s 0.999999697038 0.942 s
4 6 0.999999997155 0.620 s 0.999999992424 0.677 s 0.999999676016 2.266 s
4 7 0.999999996970 1.418 s 0.999999991931 1.582 s 0.999999654995 5.688 s
4 8 0.999999996785 2.826 s 0.999999991438 3.259 s 0.999999633939 12.819 s
4 9 0.999999996600 4.510 s 0.999999990946 5.430 s 0.999999612886 21.825 s
4 10 0.999999996415 7.003 s 0.999999990453 8.329 s 0.999999591833 36.572 s
4 11 0.999999996230 10.813 s 0.999999989960 13.298 s 0.999999570783 58.089 s
4 12 0.999999996045 16.394 s 0.999999989467 20.056 s 0.999999549734 92.057 s
4 13 0.999999995860 24.324 s 0.999999988975 29.980 s 0.999999528687 140.312 s
4 14 0.999999995675 34.667 s 0.999999988482 43.105 s 0.999999507641 206.737 s
4 15 0.999999995490 48.679 s 0.999999987989 61.488 s 0.999999486597 302.655 s
5 3 0.999999996704 0.112 s 0.999999991222 0.120 s 0.999999624638 0.347 s
5 4 0.999999997340 0.267 s 0.999999992916 0.289 s 0.999999697038 0.930 s
5 5 0.999999998843 0.713 s 0.999999996919 0.805 s 0.999999868138 2.680 s
5 6 0.999999998612 1.947 s 0.999999996304 2.179 s 0.999999841838 8.154 s
5 7 0.999999998381 3.298 s 0.999999995688 3.860 s 0.999999815539 15.385 s
5 8 0.999999998150 5.613 s 0.999999995072 6.633 s 0.999999789207 27.815 s
5 9 0.999999997918 9.382 s 0.999999994456 11.140 s 0.999999762876 47.858 s
5 10 0.999999997687 14.847 s 0.999999993840 17.993 s 0.999999736547 79.659 s
5 11 0.999999997456 23.451 s 0.999999993224 28.736 s 0.999999710220 131.086 s
5 12 0.999999997225 35.189 s 0.999999992608 43.689 s 0.999999683896 206.533 s
5 13 0.999999996993 51.936 s 0.999999991992 65.307 s 0.999999657573 313.023 s
5 14 0.999999996762 74.964 s 0.999999991376 94.072 s 0.999999631253 463.504 s
5 15 0.999999996531 106.132 s 0.999999990760 134.989 s 0.999999604934 677.744 s
Table 5. Example Analysis Results for the Revised SPIDER Model
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3.4.1 SPIDER’s Broadcast Service
SPIDER provides a broadcast service to the PEs by means of a two-round interactive consistency protocol
described in [33]. If SPIDER’s maximal fault assumption is satisﬁed, then this protocol is guaranteed to
achieve consistent broadcast:
• If at the end of the protocol, a fault-free PE receives message m, then all fault-free PEs receive the
exact same m.
• If the BIU and originating PE are fault free, then m is identical to the message broadcast.
We consider a simpliﬁed version of this protocol that does not take diagnosis and group membership
into account. This simpliﬁed protocol works as follows. When a PE is scheduled to transmit data, it sends a
message m to its BIU. This BIU checks that the message is well-formed (e.g., whether the CRC is valid). If
the message m is valid, the BIU forwards it to all the RMUs; otherwise, the BIU sends the special message
PE ERROR. Every RMU checks the validity of the message it receives. If the message is valid, the RMU
resends it to all BIUs. Otherwise, the RMU sends SOURCE ERROR to all BIUs. At this point, each BIU
receives M messages m1, . . . ,mM and it performs a vote on this set of messages. If more than half of these
messages are identical, then the majority copy is selected by the BIU and is relayed to the attached PE.
Otherwise, the BIU forwards a special message NO MAJORITY to the PE.
Our goal is now to examine the probability that this protocol achieves consistent broadcast, under some
assumptions about the rates and types of failure of BIUs and RMUs.
3.4.2 PRISM Model
We have developed a PRISM model of the interactive consistency protocol, for a ROBUS instance with three
BIUs and three RMUs. The PRISM model is actually even more simpliﬁed: it describes a single execution
of the protocol, where PE1 is the broadcast source. The full model is given in the appendix (B).
Unlike all the PRISM examples described previously, this model is a discrete-time Markov decision
process. It mixes probabilistic state transitions that model failure probabilities, and nondeterministic transi-
tions that model the behavior of faulty components. A nonfaulty component executes the protocol properly,
but may become either benign, symmetric, or asymmetric faulty with some probability. Once a component
is symmetric or asymmetric, it can exhibit a range of incorrect behaviors. We model the set of possible
behaviors as a nondeterministic choice between alternatives, to let the PRISM model checker discover the
worst-case scenarios.
The modeling follows a few general principles. Each communication link is modeled as a one-place
buffer, represented as a global system variable in PRISM. Protocol components are modeled as state-
transition systems (i.e., PRISM modules). The transmission of a message is modeled by writing the message
into the global variable representing the appropriate channel. Conversely, the reception of a message is mod-
eled by reading the channel variable. To properly coordinate the read and write operations, the transmitting
and receiving modules synchronize using transition labels.
The constant and global variables shown in Figure 9 model the protocol messages and the communica-
tion channels. Messages are represented by integers in the interval [0, 7]. There are three types of messages:
normal data, special control messages, and the special value bad message that represents any manifestly
incorrect message. This special value is intended to model missing messages, messages with a wrong CRC,
or any other other type of error that can be recognized by the recipient.
Because PRISM requires all types to be ﬁnite, we represent the possible valid data by the three constants
data1, data2, and data3. At least three good values are necessary to model fault scenarios such as the
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const int data1 = 0;
const int data2 = 1;
const int data3 = 2;
const int pe_error = 4;
const int source_error = 5;
const int no_majority = 6;
const int bad_message = 7;
// Global variables = communication links
global pe1_biu1: [0..7] init 0;
global pe2_biu2: [0..7] init 0;
global pe3_biu3: [0..7] init 0;
global biu1_rmu1: [0..7] init 0;
global biu1_rmu2: [0..7] init 0;
global biu1_rmu3: [0..7] init 0;
global biu2_rmu1: [0..7] init 0;
global biu2_rmu2: [0..7] init 0;
global biu2_rmu3: [0..7] init 0;
global biu3_rmu1: [0..7] init 0;
global biu3_rmu2: [0..7] init 0;
global biu3_rmu3: [0..7] init 0;
// Source data that PE1 will broadcast
const int source = data3;
Figure 9. Messages and Communication Channels
transmission of distinct messages by an asymmetric BIU to the three RMUs, without any of these messages
being recognized as incorrect by the recipient.4
The global variables such as pe1 biu1 represent bidirectional channels between two components (e.g.,
between PE1 and BIU1).
The protocol processes are modeled as illustrated in Figure 10. The ﬁgure shows a fragment of the PE1
model, which consists of two modules: pe1 error is the fault model for PE1, and pe1 models protocol
execution.
Module pe1 error speciﬁes that PE1 may suffer a single fault at an arbitrary time during protocol
execution. The time of occurrence is nondeterministic, but the fault type is randomly selected according to
the probability distribution deﬁned by the parameters pe benign and pe symmetric.
Module pe1 has a main control variable pe1 ctrl that speciﬁes successive steps of the protocol. For
example, from state 0, the process initiates a broadcast by transmitting the source message to BIU1 and
then transitions to the next step, where pe1 ctrl=1. The actual message transmitted depends on PE1’s
current fault status. If PE1 is fault free, then the source data is sent; if PE1 is benign, then the bad message
is sent (BIU1 will recognize this message as incorrect); otherwise, PE1 has suffered a symmetric fault and it
may send arbitrary data to BIU1. We model the latter case, as a nondeterministic choice between three state
transitions, as shown in Figure 10.
In all cases, the broadcast action sets pe1 ctrl to 1, and the only possible transition of process pe1
4One could argue that more good data values would allow us to model more general faulty behaviors, such as, an asymmetric
RMU sending three distinct messages that are also different from the message it receives. Unfortunately, we were not able to add
an extra data4 value, as this causes PRISM to run out of memory.
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module pe1_error
pe1_faulted: bool init false;
pe1_error: [0..2] init fault_free;
[] (!pe1_faulted) ->
pe_benign: (pe1_error’=benign_faulty) & (pe1_faulted’=true)
+ pe_symmetric: (pe1_error’=symmetric_faulty) & (pe1_faulted’=true)
+ pe_nofault: (pe1_error’=fault_free) & (pe1_faulted’=true);
endmodule
module pe1
pe1_ctrl: [0..4] init 0;
pe1_out: [0..7] init 0;
// broadcast
[] (pe1_ctrl=0) & (pe1_error=fault_free) -> (pe1_ctrl’=1) &
(pe1_biu1’ = source);
...
[] (pe1_ctrl=0) & (pe1_error=symmetric_faulty) -> (pe1_ctrl’=1) &
(pe1_biu1’=data1);
[] (pe1_ctrl=0) & (pe1_error=symmetric_faulty) -> (pe1_ctrl’=1) &
(pe1_biu1’=data2);
[] (pe1_ctrl=0) & (pe1_error=symmetric_faulty) -> (pe1_ctrl’=1) &
(pe1_biu1’=data3);
[pe1_broadcast] (pe1_ctrl=1) -> (pe1_ctrl’=2);
...
endmodule
Figure 10. Broadcast Protocol: Process PE1
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// BIU1
module biu1
biu1_ctrl: [0..6] init 0;
// wait for broadcast from pe1
[pe1_broadcast] (biu1_ctrl=0) -> (biu1_ctrl’=1);
// Fault-free case: consume the message and forward it to all rmus
[] (biu1_ctrl=1) & (biu1_error=fault_free) & (pe1_biu1!=bad_message) ->
(biu1_ctrl’=2) & (biu1_rmu1’=pe1_biu1) &
(biu1_rmu2’=pe1_biu1) & (biu1_rmu3’=pe1_biu1);
[] (biu1_ctrl=1) & (biu1_error=fault_free) & (pe1_biu1=bad_message) ->
(biu1_ctrl’=2) & (biu1_rmu1’=pe_error) &
(biu1_rmu2’=pe_error) & (biu1_rmu3’=pe_error);
Figure 11. Broadcast Protocol: Process BIU1
after the broadcast increments pe1 ctrl. This transition has the label pe1 broadcast, and its role
is to synchronize pe1 and biu1, so that the latter can consume the message just transmitted. Figure 11
shows the corresponding speciﬁcation fragment for module biu1. Initially, biu1 is in state 0. It stays in
that state until it can execute the transition labeled with pe1 broadcast, which increments biu1 ctrl
so that the next transitions from biu1 are enabled. Since all transitions that share the same label must
execute simultaneously, both pe1 and biu1 perform this transition: that is, just after pe1 has transmitted
a message, and just before biu1 reads that message. A similar mechanism, based on synchronized labeled
transitions is used throughout the PRISM speciﬁcation to model all communication.
3.4.3 Protocol Properties
The full protocol model is speciﬁed in the appendix (B). For scalability reasons, we have included fault
models for only two components—pe1 and biu1. All the other PEs and BIUs, and all the RMUs are
assumed to be fault free. Several sets of states are identiﬁed and used in property speciﬁcations:
label "done" = pe1_ctrl=4 & pe2_ctrl=2 & pe3_ctrl=2;
label "all_good" = (pe1_out=source) & (pe2_out=source)
& (pe3_out=source);
label "unanimous" = (pe1_out=pe2_out) & (pe1_out=pe3_out);
label "nonfaulty_agree" = (pe2_out=pe3_out);
label "nonfaulty_valid" = (pe2_out=source) & (pe3_out=source);
The set of states called done indicates protocol termination. The other sets of states capture two variants
of the consistency and validity properties that the protocol is intended to achieve. For example, all good
means that all PEs receive the source message, whereas unanimous is the weaker property that all PEs
receive the same thing.
We examined the protocol properties listed in the appendix (B). First, we expect that the protocol always
terminates, so the following PRISM property should be true:
"init"=>P>=1 [ F "done" ]
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Then, we investigate the probabilities of agreement and validity. Since the PRISM model is a Markov
decision process, the actual probabilities depend on how the nondeterministic choices are resolved. For
example, we can consider two variants of the same property:
Pmin =? [ G("done" => "all_good") ]
Pmax =? [ G("done" => "all_good") ]
In the ﬁrst line, we ask for the minimal probability that the protocol ends in a state where all PEs receive the
broadcast as transmitted. This is the probability of success under the worst possible fault scenario allowed
in our model. Conversely, the second line asks for the maximal probability of success (which should be 1).
3.4.4 Analysis Results
Table 6 shows the results and runtime we observed when running the PRISM model checker on the above
example. It also shows model-construction time and the amount of memory consumed by the PRISM
process. This data was measured on a 64bit Linux 2.6 system, with an Intel Core 2 CPU, and 4 GB of RAM.
The results show that it is possible to analyze these example properties in about 8 minutes. However, the
performance numbers are disappointing given the size of the example model. Most of the veriﬁcation time
is spent by PRISM in building an internal representation of the MDP. The internal representation is based on
multi-terminal binary decision diagrams (MTBDDs), which appear to be a very poor representation for this
model. In particular, the amount of memory used to store the MTBDDs and other internal data structures is
enormous; it requires more than 3 GB. This seems to be a serious limitation of the MTBDD representation,
as the statistics displayed by PRISM indicate that the actual size of the underlying MDP is not that large: it
contains 15446 states and 50357 transitions.5
It is well-known that the variable ordering used by an MTBDD can have a major impact on the size
of this MTBDD. But there is no obvious way to control which ordering PRISM will use. All our efforts
at reorganizing the speciﬁcations by changing module and declaration order did not have an impact on
the analysis time or memory usage. There has been some work on heuristics for obtaining good variable
ordering for MTBDDs in PRISM [20], but these heuristics were not implemented in the PRISM version that
we used.
4 Conclusion
We have described several applications of the PRISM probabilistic model checker to fault-tolerant dis-
tributed systems.
We ﬁrst investigated the use of PRISM in reliability modeling, as an alternative to other tools such
as SURE or Mo¨bius. In this study, we considered two different approaches to modeling the reliability of
the SPIDER system. Both approaches relied on continuous-time Markov chains. The main result of this
experiment is that PRISM is perfectly adequate as a reliability analysis tool. The PRISM speciﬁcation
language is expressive enough and enables easy modeling. The model checker performance is also good,
and PRISM can be used to analyze relatively large and detailed models. There is still a limitation to this
approach, since PRISM cannot encode or analyze non-Markovian models, unlike other tools that support
semi-Markovian models or more general classes of stochastic systems.
In a second experiment, we examined application of PRISM to the analysis of a more detailed SPIDER
protocol, encoded as a state machine. The PRISM model developed for this purpose was a Markov decision
5We have observed very high memory usage (gigabytes) on much smaller MDPs with fewer than a hundred states and a few
hundred transitions.
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Property Result Runtime
"init"=>P>=1 [ F "done" ] true 1.801 s
P>=1 [ G ("done"=>"all_good") ] false 3.041 s
P>=1 [ G ("done"=>"unanimous") ] false 1.950 s
Pmin =? [ G("done" => "unanimous") ] 0.7 1.620 s
Pmax =? [G("done" => "unanimous")] 1.0 0.727 s
Pmin =? [G ("done" => "nonfaulty_agree")] 1.0 0.021 s
Pmax =? [G ("done" => "nonfaulty_agree")] 1.0 0.060 s
Pmin =? [G ("done" => "nonfaulty_valid")] 0.56 2.195 s
Pmax =? [G ("done" => "nonfaulty_valid")] 1.0 0.473 s
Model Construction: 450.023 s
Virtual Memory Used: 3676 Mb
Resident Memory Used: 2358 Mb
Table 6. Broadcast Protocol: Analysis Results
process, in which fault occurrence and the behavior of faulty components are modeled via nondeterministic
choices, while the type of fault is determined by a probability distribution given a priori. This experiment
showed that it is possible to model and analyze a fault-tolerant protocol using PRISM, but it also showed
some limits of the PRISM tool. Although the protocol modeled was quite small, PRISM required a very
large amount of memory to build and store its internal data structures for this Markov decision process.
Scalability to more complex protocols or systems is then questionable.
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Appendix A
Reliability Models of SPIDER
A.1 Baseline Model
//
// Fault/reliability model for a SPIDER instance
// modeled as a continuous-time Markov chain
//
// This model includes 3 BIUs and 3 RMUs
//
// All components are assumed to have similar fault models parameterized by:
// perm_lambda: rate of permanent faults
// trans_lambda: rate of transient faults
// repair_lambda: recovery rate from transient faults
//
// Three classes of faults are considered: benign, symmetric, and asymmetric.
//
// Two parameters define the probability that a fault is benign or symmetric:
// benign_ratio: probability that a fault is benign
// symmetric_ratio: probability that a fault is symmetric
// asymmetric_ratio: probability that a fault is asymmetric
// = (1 - benign_ratio - symmetric_ratio)
//
ctmc
// Error states of each component
const int good = 0;
const int benign = 1;
const int symmetric = 2;
const int asymmetric = 3;
// Parameters: arrival rates for each component
const double perm_lambda; // permanent faults (e.g., 10ˆ-6)
const double trans_lambda; // transient faults (e.g., 10ˆ-5)
const double repair_lambda; // recovery from transient faults (e.g., 10)
// Fractions of benign/symmetric/asymmetric faults
// all must be between 0 and 1 and they must add to 1
const double benign_ratio; // 0.5
const double symmetric_ratio; // 0.3
const double asymmetric_ratio = (1 - benign_ratio - symmetric_ratio);
// Fault arrival rates for the RMUs(faults/hour)
const double rmu_perm_lambda = perm_lambda;
const double rmu_trans_lambda = trans_lambda;
const double rmu_repair_lambda = repair_lambda;
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// Fraction of fault types:
const double rmu_benign = benign_ratio;
const double rmu_symmetric = symmetric_ratio;
const double rmu_asymmetric = asymmetric_ratio;
// Fault arrival rates for the BIUs
const double biu_perm_lambda = perm_lambda;
const double biu_trans_lambda = trans_lambda;
const double biu_repair_lambda = repair_lambda;
// Fractions
const double biu_benign = benign_ratio;
const double biu_symmetric = symmetric_ratio;
const double biu_asymmetric = asymmetric_ratio;
// Error model for BIU1
module biu1
biu1_state: [0..3] init good;
biu1_permanent: bool init false;
[] biu1_state = good ->
(biu_perm_lambda * biu_benign): (biu1_state’=benign) &
(biu1_permanent’=true)
+ (biu_perm_lambda * biu_symmetric): (biu1_state’=symmetric) &
(biu1_permanent’=true)
+ (biu_perm_lambda * biu_asymmetric): (biu1_state’=asymmetric) &
(biu1_permanent’=true)
+ (biu_trans_lambda * biu_benign): (biu1_state’=benign) &
(biu1_permanent’=false)
+ (biu_trans_lambda * biu_symmetric): (biu1_state’=symmetric) &
(biu1_permanent’=false)
+ (biu_trans_lambda * biu_asymmetric): (biu1_state’=asymmetric) &
(biu1_permanent’=false);
// recovery from transient faults
[] (!biu1_permanent & biu1_state != good) ->
biu_repair_lambda: (biu1_state’=good) & (biu1_permanent’=false);
endmodule
// Same model for BIU2 and BIU3, modulo renaming
module biu2 = biu1[biu1_state=biu2_state,
biu1_permanent=biu2_permanent]
endmodule
module biu3 = biu1[biu1_state=biu3_state,
biu1_permanent=biu3_permanent]
endmodule
30
// Error model for RMU1: same as for BIU1 modulo renaming
module rmu1 = biu1[biu1_state=rmu1_state,
biu1_permanent=rmu1_permanent,
biu_perm_lambda=rmu_perm_lambda,
biu_trans_lambda=rmu_trans_lambda,
biu_benign=rmu_benign,
biu_symmetric=rmu_symmetric,
biu_asymmetric=rmu_asymmetric]
endmodule
// Same model for RMU2 and RMU3 too
module rmu2 = rmu1[rmu1_state=rmu2_state,
rmu1_permanent=rmu2_permanent]
endmodule
module rmu3 = rmu1[rmu1_state=rmu3_state,
rmu1_permanent=rmu3_permanent]
endmodule
//
// Maximum fault assumption for SPIDER
// - at least two good BIUs or one good BIU and two benign BIUs
// - at least two good RMUs or one good RMU and two benign RMUs
// - at most one asymmetric BIU or RMU
//
formula two_good_bius =
(biu1_state=good & biu2_state=good) | (biu1_state=good & biu3_state=good)
| (biu2_state=good & biu3_state=good);
formula one_good_two_benign_bius =
(biu1_state=good & biu2_state=benign & biu3_state=benign)
| (biu1_state=benign & biu2_state=good & biu3_state=benign)
| (biu1_state=benign & biu2_state=benign & biu3_state=good);
formula no_asymmetric_bius =
biu1_state!=asymmetric & biu2_state!=asymmetric & biu3_state!=asymmetric;
formula two_good_rmus =
(rmu1_state=good & rmu2_state=good) | (rmu1_state=good & rmu3_state=good)
| (rmu2_state=good & rmu3_state=good);
formula one_good_two_benign_rmus =
(rmu1_state=good & rmu2_state=benign & rmu3_state=benign)
| (rmu1_state=benign & rmu2_state=good & rmu3_state=benign)
| (rmu1_state=benign & rmu2_state=benign & rmu3_state=good);
formula no_asymmetric_rmus =
rmu1_state!=asymmetric & rmu2_state!=asymmetric & rmu3_state!=asymmetric;
label "functional" =
(two_good_bius | one_good_two_benign_bius)
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& (two_good_rmus | one_good_two_benign_rmus)
& (no_asymmetric_bius | no_asymmetric_rmus);
//
// Other system states used in properties
//
formula all_bius_good =
(biu1_state=good) & (biu2_state=good) & (biu3_state=good);
formula all_rmus_good =
(rmu1_state=good) & (rmu2_state=good) & (rmu3_state=good);
// No faulty component
label "all_good" = all_bius_good & all_rmus_good;
//
// To test reliability after a symmetric fault
//
formula one_symmetric_biu =
(biu1_state=symmetric & biu2_state=good & biu3_state=good)
| (biu1_state=good & biu2_state=symmetric & biu3_state=good)
| (biu1_state=good & biu2_state=good & biu3_state=symmetric);
formula one_symmetric_rmu =
(rmu1_state=symmetric & rmu2_state=good & rmu3_state=good)
| (rmu1_state=good & rmu2_state=symmetric & rmu3_state=good)
| (rmu1_state=good & rmu2_state=good & rmu3_state=symmetric);
label "one_fault" =
(one_symmetric_biu & all_rmus_good) | (one_symmetric_rmu & all_bius_good);
rewards "total_time"
true: 1;
endrewards
Properties for the previous model
// Probability that no component fails over a 10hour run
P=? [ G<=10 "all_good" ]
// Expected time to the first component failure
R{"total_time"}=? [ F !"all_good" ]
// Probability that the system does not fail over a 5hour run
P=? [ G<=5 "functional" ]
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// Probability that the system does not fail over a 10hours run
P=? [ G<=10 "functional" ]
// Probability that the system does not fail over a 100hour run
P=? [ G<=100 "functional" ]
// The probability of system failure over a 1hour run is less than 10ˆ-8
"all_good"=>P<=1e-8 [ F<=1 !"functional" ]
// The probability of system failure over a 1hour run is less than 10ˆ-9
"all_good"=>P<=1e-9 [ F<=1 !"functional" ]
// The probability of system failure over a 1hour run is less than 10ˆ-10
"all_good"=>P<=1e-10 [ F<=1 !"functional" ]
// Probability of system failure after a one hour run is less than 1e-3,
// even if we start with a single benign component failure.
"one_fault"=>P<=1e-3 [ F<=1 !"functional" ]
// Probability of system failure after a one hour run is less than 1e-4,
// even if we start with a single benign component failure.
"one_fault"=>P<=1e-4 [ F<=1 !"functional" ]
// Probability of system failure after a one hour run is less than 1e-5,
// even if we start with a single benign component failure.
"one_fault"=>P<=1e-5 [ F<=1 !"functional" ]
// Probability of system failure after a one hour run is less than 1e-6,
// even if we start with a single benign component failure.
"one_fault"=>P<=1e-6 [ F<=1 !"functional" ]
// Probability of system failure after a one hour run is less than 1e-7,
// even if we start with a symmetric component.
"one_fault"=>P<=1e-7 [ F<=1 !"functional" ]
// Probability of system failure after a one hour run is less than 1e-8,
// even if we start with a single benign component failure.
"one_fault"=>P<=1e-8 [ F<=1 !"functional" ]
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A.2 Revised Model
//
// Fault/reliability model for SPIDER
// modeled as a continuous-time Markov chain
//
// This model uses counters for the number of good and faulty RMUs and BIUs
// Two parameters are used: N = number of BIUs, M = number of RMUs
//
// All components are assumed to have similar fault models parameterized by:
// perm_lambda: rate of permanent faults
// trans_lambda: rate of transient faults
// repair_lambda: recovery rate from transient faults
//
// Three classes of faults are considered: benign, symmetric, and asymmetric.
//
// Two parameters define the probability that a fault is benign or symmetric:
// benign_ratio: probability that a fault is benign
// symmetric_ratio: probability that a fault is symmetric
// asymmetric_ratio: probability that a fault is asymmetric =
// (1 - benign_ratio - symmetric_ratio)
//
ctmc
// Parameters: arrival rates for each component
const double perm_lambda; // permanent faults (e.g., 10ˆ-6)
const double trans_lambda; // transient faults (e.g., 10ˆ-5)
const double repair_lambda; // recovery from transient faults (e.g., 10)
// Fractions of benign/symmetric/asymmetric faults
// all must be between 0 and 1 and they must add to 1
const double benign_ratio; // e.g., 0.5
const double symmetric_ratio; // e.g., 0.3
const double asymmetric_ratio = (1 - benign_ratio - symmetric_ratio);
// Fault arrival rates for the RMUs(faults/hour)
const double rmu_perm_lambda = perm_lambda;
const double rmu_trans_lambda = trans_lambda;
const double rmu_repair_lambda = repair_lambda;
// Fraction of fault types:
const double rmu_benign = benign_ratio;
const double rmu_symmetric = symmetric_ratio;
const double rmu_asymmetric = asymmetric_ratio;
// Fault arrival rates for the BIUs
const double biu_perm_lambda = perm_lambda;
const double biu_trans_lambda = trans_lambda;
const double biu_repair_lambda = repair_lambda;
// Fractions
const double biu_benign = benign_ratio;
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const double biu_symmetric = symmetric_ratio;
const double biu_asymmetric = asymmetric_ratio;
// Total number of BIUs and RMUs
const int N; // number of BIUs
const int M; // number of RMUs
module spider_bius
good_bius: [0..N] init N;
benign_transient_bius: [0..N] init 0;
symmetric_transient_bius: [0..N] init 0;
asymmetric_transient_bius: [0..N] init 0;
benign_permanent_bius: [0..N] init 0;
symmetric_permanent_bius: [0..N] init 0;
asymmetric_permanent_bius: [0..N] init 0;
// Fault of one good BIU
// NOTE: prism complains if we give only ’good_bius>0’ as precondition
[] good_bius>0 &
benign_transient_bius<N & benign_permanent_bius<N &
symmetric_transient_bius<N & symmetric_permanent_bius<N &
asymmetric_transient_bius<N & asymmetric_permanent_bius<N
->
(biu_trans_lambda * good_bius * biu_benign) :
(good_bius’=good_bius-1) &
(benign_transient_bius’= benign_transient_bius+1)
+ (biu_trans_lambda * good_bius * biu_symmetric) :
(good_bius’=good_bius-1) &
(symmetric_transient_bius’= symmetric_transient_bius+1)
+ (biu_trans_lambda * good_bius * biu_asymmetric) :
(good_bius’=good_bius-1) &
(asymmetric_transient_bius’=asymmetric_transient_bius+1)
+ (biu_perm_lambda * good_bius * biu_benign) :
(good_bius’=good_bius-1) &
(benign_permanent_bius’= benign_permanent_bius+1)
+ (biu_perm_lambda * good_bius * biu_symmetric) :
(good_bius’=good_bius-1) &
(symmetric_permanent_bius’= symmetric_permanent_bius+1)
+ (biu_perm_lambda * good_bius * biu_asymmetric) :
(good_bius’=good_bius-1) &
(asymmetric_permanent_bius’=asymmetric_permanent_bius+1);
// recovery from transient faults
[] (benign_transient_bius>0 & good_bius<N) ->
(biu_repair_lambda * benign_transient_bius) :
(good_bius’=good_bius+1) &
(benign_transient_bius’=benign_transient_bius-1);
[] (symmetric_transient_bius>0 & good_bius<N) ->
(biu_repair_lambda * symmetric_transient_bius) :
(good_bius’=good_bius+1) &
(symmetric_transient_bius’=symmetric_transient_bius-1);
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[] (asymmetric_transient_bius>0 & good_bius<N) ->
(biu_repair_lambda * asymmetric_transient_bius) :
(good_bius’=good_bius+1) &
(asymmetric_transient_bius’=asymmetric_transient_bius-1);
endmodule
// RMU error model: same thing modulo renaming
module spider_rmus =
spider_bius[N=M,
good_bius=good_rmus,
benign_transient_bius=benign_transient_rmus,
symmetric_transient_bius=symmetric_transient_rmus,
asymmetric_transient_bius=asymmetric_transient_rmus,
benign_permanent_bius=benign_permanent_rmus,
symmetric_permanent_bius=symmetric_permanent_rmus,
asymmetric_permanent_bius=asymmetric_permanent_rmus,
biu_trans_lambda=rmu_trans_lambda,
biu_perm_lambda=rmu_perm_lambda,
biu_repair_lambda=rmu_repair_lambda,
biu_benign=rmu_benign,
biu_symmetric=rmu_symmetric,
biu_asymmetric=rmu_asymmetric]
endmodule
// Abbreviations
formula symmetric_bius =
symmetric_transient_bius+symmetric_permanent_bius;
formula asymmetric_bius =
asymmetric_transient_bius+asymmetric_permanent_bius;
formula bad_bius = symmetric_bius + asymmetric_bius;
formula symmetric_rmus =
symmetric_transient_rmus+symmetric_permanent_rmus;
formula asymmetric_rmus =
asymmetric_transient_rmus+asymmetric_permanent_rmus;
formula bad_rmus = symmetric_rmus + asymmetric_rmus;
//
// Maximal fault assumption:
// - number of good BIUs > number of bad BIUs
// - number of good RMUs > number of bad RMUs
// - no asymmetric BIUs or no asymmetric RMUs
//
label "functional" =
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(good_bius > bad_bius) & (good_rmus > bad_rmus)
& (asymmetric_bius=0 | asymmetric_rmus=0);
// No component faulty
label "all_good" = (good_bius=N) & (good_rmus=M);
// At most one symmetric faulty component
label "one_fault" =
(good_bius>=N-1) & (good_rmus>=M-1)
& (asymmetric_bius=0) & (asymmetric_rmus=0)
& (((symmetric_bius=1) & (symmetric_rmus=0))
| ((symmetric_bius=0) & (symmetric_rmus=1)));
// For expected times
rewards "total_time"
true: 1;
endrewards
Properties for the previous model
// Probability that no component fails over a 10hour run
P=? [ G<=10 "all_good" ]
// Expected time to the first component failure
R{"total_time"}=? [ F !"all_good" ]
// Probability that the system does not fail over a 5hour run
P=? [ G<=5 "functional" ]
// Probability that the system does not fail over a 10hours run
P=? [ G<=10 "functional" ]
// Probability that the system does not fail over a 100hour run
P=? [ G<=100 "functional" ]
// The probability of system failure over a 1hour run is less than 10ˆ-9
"all_good"=>P<=1e-9 [ F<=1 !"functional" ]
// Probability of system failure after a one hour run is less than 1e-9,
// even if we start from a start with a single benign component failure.
"one_fault"=>P<=1e-9 [ F<=1 !"functional" ]
// Probability of system failure after a one hour run is less than 1e-8,
// even if we start from a start with a single benign component failure.
"one_fault"=>P<=1e-8 [ F<=1 !"functional" ]
// Probability of system failure after a one hour run is less than 1e-8,
// even if we start from a start with a single benign component failure.
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"one_fault"=>P<=1e-7 [ F<=1 !"functional" ]
// Probability of system failure after a one hour run is less than 1e-8,
// even if we start from a start with a single benign component failure.
"one_fault"=>P<=1e-3 [ F<=1 !"functional" ]
// Probability of system failure after a one hour run is less than 1e-8,
// even if we start from a start with a single benign component failure.
"one_fault"=>P<=1e-4 [ F<=1 !"functional" ]
// Probability of system failure after a one hour run is less than 1e-8,
// even if we start from a start with a single benign component failure.
"one_fault"=>P<=1e-5 [ F<=1 !"functional" ]
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Appendix B
Model of SPIDER’s Broadcast Service
mdp
// Messages: encoded in the range [0 .. 7]
// data1 .. data3 are data messages
// pe_error, source_error, no_majority: special messages
// bad_message: manifest fault
const int data1 = 0;
const int data2 = 1;
const int data3 = 2;
const int pe_error = 4;
const int source_error = 5;
const int no_majority = 6;
const int bad_message = 7;
// Error states of each component
const int fault_free = 0;
const int benign_faulty = 1;
const int symmetric_faulty = 2;
const int asymmetric_faulty = 3;
// Transition probabilities for BIU error model
const double biu_benign = 0.1;
const double biu_symmetric = 0.1;
const double biu_asymmetric = 0.1;
formula biu_nofault = (1 - biu_benign - biu_symmetric - biu_asymmetric);
// Transition probabilities for PE error model
const double pe_benign = 0.1;
const double pe_symmetric = 0.1;
formula pe_nofault = (1 - pe_benign - pe_symmetric);
// Transition probabilities for RMU error model
const double rmu_benign = 0.1;
const double rmu_symmetric = 0.1;
const double rmu_asymmetric = 0.1;
formula rmu_nofault = (1 - rmu_benign - rmu_symmetric - rmu_asymmetric);
// Global variables = communication links
// each link is an integer variable
global pe1_biu1: [0..7] init 0;
global pe2_biu2: [0..7] init 0;
global pe3_biu3: [0..7] init 0;
global biu1_rmu1: [0..7] init 0;
global biu1_rmu2: [0..7] init 0;
global biu1_rmu3: [0..7] init 0;
global biu2_rmu1: [0..7] init 0;
global biu2_rmu2: [0..7] init 0;
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global biu2_rmu3: [0..7] init 0;
global biu3_rmu1: [0..7] init 0;
global biu3_rmu2: [0..7] init 0;
global biu3_rmu3: [0..7] init 0;
// source data: what PE1 will broadcast
// it must be valid data
//
// NOTE: prism does not allow me to specify that source must
// be equal to data1, data2, or data3 here.
const int source = data3;
// Majority vote for BIU1 when it receives three messages
// in biu1_rmu1, biu1_rmu2, biu1_rmu3
formula vote1 =
(biu1_rmu1=biu1_rmu2) ? ((biu1_rmu1!=bad_message) ? biu1_rmu1 : biu1_rmu3)
: (biu1_rmu2=biu1_rmu3) ? ((biu1_rmu2!=bad_message) ? biu1_rmu2 : biu1_rmu1)
: no_majority;
// Same thing for BIU2
formula vote2 =
(biu2_rmu1=biu2_rmu2) ? ((biu2_rmu1!=bad_message) ? biu2_rmu1 : biu2_rmu3)
: (biu2_rmu2=biu2_rmu3) ? ((biu2_rmu2!=bad_message) ? biu2_rmu2 : biu2_rmu1)
: no_majority;
// ERROR MODEL FOR PE1
module pe1_error
pe1_faulted: bool init false;
pe1_error: [0..2] init fault_free;
[] (!pe1_faulted) ->
pe_benign: (pe1_error’=benign_faulty) & (pe1_faulted’=true)
+ pe_symmetric: (pe1_error’=symmetric_faulty) & (pe1_faulted’=true)
+ pe_nofault: (pe1_error’=fault_free) & (pe1_faulted’=true);
endmodule
// PE1
module pe1
pe1_ctrl: [0..4] init 0;
pe1_out: [0..7] init 0;
// broadcast
[] (pe1_ctrl=0) & (pe1_error=fault_free) -> (pe1_ctrl’=1) &
(pe1_biu1’ = source);
[] (pe1_ctrl=0) & (pe1_error=benign_faulty) -> (pe1_ctrl’=1) &
(pe1_biu1’=bad_message);
[] (pe1_ctrl=0) & (pe1_error=symmetric_faulty) -> (pe1_ctrl’=1) &
(pe1_biu1’=data1);
[] (pe1_ctrl=0) & (pe1_error=symmetric_faulty) -> (pe1_ctrl’=1) &
(pe1_biu1’=data2);
[] (pe1_ctrl=0) & (pe1_error=symmetric_faulty) -> (pe1_ctrl’=1) &
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(pe1_biu1’=data3);
[pe1_broadcast] (pe1_ctrl=1) -> (pe1_ctrl’=2);
// wait for message from BIU1
[biu1_send] (pe1_ctrl=2) -> (pe1_ctrl’=3);
// consume the message: copy it into pe1_out
[] (pe1_ctrl=3) -> (pe1_ctrl’=4) & (pe1_out’ = pe1_biu1);
endmodule
// ERROR MODEL FOR BIU1
module biu1_error
biu1_faulted: bool init false;
biu1_error: [0..3] init fault_free;
[] (!biu1_faulted) ->
biu_benign : (biu1_error’ = benign_faulty) & (biu1_faulted’=true)
+ biu_symmetric : (biu1_error’ = symmetric_faulty) &
(biu1_faulted’=true)
+ biu_asymmetric: (biu1_error’ = asymmetric_faulty) &
(biu1_faulted’=true)
+ biu_nofault: (biu1_error’ = fault_free) & (biu1_faulted’=true);
endmodule
// BIU1
module biu1
biu1_ctrl: [0..6] init 0;
// wait for broadcast from pe1
[pe1_broadcast] (biu1_ctrl=0) -> (biu1_ctrl’=1);
// Fault-free case: consume the message and forward it to all rmus
[] (biu1_ctrl=1) & (biu1_error=fault_free) & (pe1_biu1!=bad_message) ->
(biu1_ctrl’=2) & (biu1_rmu1’=pe1_biu1) &
(biu1_rmu2’=pe1_biu1) & (biu1_rmu3’=pe1_biu1);
[] (biu1_ctrl=1) & (biu1_error=fault_free) & (pe1_biu1=bad_message) ->
(biu1_ctrl’=2) & (biu1_rmu1’=pe_error) &
(biu1_rmu2’=pe_error) & (biu1_rmu3’=pe_error);
// Benign fault: send manifest bad message to all rmus
[] (biu1_ctrl=1) & (biu1_error=benign_faulty) ->
(biu1_ctrl’=2) & (biu1_rmu1’=bad_message) &
(biu1_rmu2’=bad_message) & (biu1_rmu3’=bad_message);
// Symmetric fault: send the same arbitrary message to all rmus
[] (biu1_ctrl=1) & (biu1_error=symmetric_faulty) -> (biu1_ctrl’=2) &
(biu1_rmu1’=data1) & (biu1_rmu2’=data1) & (biu1_rmu3’=data1);
[] (biu1_ctrl=1) & (biu1_error=symmetric_faulty) -> (biu1_ctrl’=2) &
(biu1_rmu1’=data2) & (biu1_rmu2’=data2) & (biu1_rmu3’=data2);
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[] (biu1_ctrl=1) & (biu1_error=symmetric_faulty) -> (biu1_ctrl’=2) &
(biu1_rmu1’=data3) & (biu1_rmu2’=data3) & (biu1_rmu3’=data3);
// Asymmetric fault: send different messages to the rmus
// TODO: add more combinations
[] (biu1_ctrl=1) & (biu1_error=asymmetric_faulty) -> (biu1_ctrl’=2) &
(biu1_rmu1’=data1) & (biu1_rmu2’=data2) & (biu1_rmu3’=data3);
[] (biu1_ctrl=1) & (biu1_error=asymmetric_faulty) -> (biu1_ctrl’=2) &
(biu1_rmu1’=data1) & (biu1_rmu2’=data2) & (biu1_rmu3’=data2);
[] (biu1_ctrl=1) & (biu1_error=asymmetric_faulty) -> (biu1_ctrl’=2) &
(biu1_rmu1’=data1) & (biu1_rmu2’=data1) & (biu1_rmu3’=data2);
[] (biu1_ctrl=1) & (biu1_error=asymmetric_faulty) ->
(biu1_ctrl’=2) & (biu1_rmu1’=bad_message) &
(biu1_rmu2’=data1) & (biu1_rmu3’=data3);
[] (biu1_ctrl=1) & (biu1_error=asymmetric_faulty) -> (biu1_ctrl’=2) &
(biu1_rmu1’=pe_error) & (biu1_rmu2’=data1) & (biu1_rmu3’=data2);
// Synchronization: allow RMUs to read the message
[biu1_broadcast] (biu1_ctrl=2) -> (biu1_ctrl’=3);
// wait for replay from all RMUs
[rmu_relay] (biu1_ctrl=3) -> (biu1_ctrl’=4);
// consume the three messages from the RMU and compute the
// majority
[] (biu1_ctrl=4) & (biu1_error=fault_free) ->
(biu1_ctrl’=5) & (pe1_biu1’=vote1);
[] (biu1_ctrl=4) & (biu1_error=benign_faulty) ->
(biu1_ctrl’=5) & (pe1_biu1’=bad_message);
[] (biu1_ctrl=4) & (biu1_error=symmetric_faulty) ->
(biu1_ctrl’=5) & (pe1_biu1’=data1);
[] (biu1_ctrl=4) & (biu1_error=symmetric_faulty) ->
(biu1_ctrl’=5) & (pe1_biu1’=data2);
[] (biu1_ctrl=4) & (biu1_error=symmetric_faulty) ->
(biu1_ctrl’=5) & (pe1_biu1’=data3);
[] (biu1_ctrl=4) & (biu1_error=symmetric_faulty) ->
(biu1_ctrl’=5) & (pe1_biu1’=pe_error);
[] (biu1_ctrl=4) & (biu1_error=symmetric_faulty) ->
(biu1_ctrl’=5) & (pe1_biu1’=source_error);
[] (biu1_ctrl=4) & (biu1_error=symmetric_faulty) ->
(biu1_ctrl’=5) & (pe1_biu1’=no_majority);
[] (biu1_ctrl=4) & (biu1_error=asymmetric_faulty) ->
(biu1_ctrl’=5) & (pe1_biu1’=data1);
[] (biu1_ctrl=4) & (biu1_error=asymmetric_faulty) ->
(biu1_ctrl’=5) & (pe1_biu1’=data2);
[] (biu1_ctrl=4) & (biu1_error=asymmetric_faulty) ->
(biu1_ctrl’=5) & (pe1_biu1’=data3);
[] (biu1_ctrl=4) & (biu1_error=asymmetric_faulty) ->
(biu1_ctrl’=5) & (pe1_biu1’=pe_error);
[] (biu1_ctrl=4) & (biu1_error=asymmetric_faulty) ->
(biu1_ctrl’=5) & (pe1_biu1’=source_error);
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[] (biu1_ctrl=4) & (biu1_error=asymmetric_faulty) ->
(biu1_ctrl’=5) & (pe1_biu1’=no_majority);
[biu1_send] (biu1_ctrl=5) -> (biu1_ctrl’=6);
endmodule
// RMU1
module rmu1
rmu1_ctrl: [0..3] init 0;
// Wait for data from BIU1
[biu1_broadcast] (rmu1_ctrl=0) -> (rmu1_ctrl’=1);
// consume the message and forward it to all BIUs
[] (rmu1_ctrl=1) -> (rmu1_ctrl’=2) & (biu1_rmu1’=biu1_rmu1) &
(biu2_rmu1’=biu1_rmu1) & (biu3_rmu1’=biu1_rmu1);
[rmu_relay] (rmu1_ctrl=2) -> (rmu1_ctrl’=3);
// done
// [] (rmu1_ctrl=3) -> (rmu1_ctrl’=3);
endmodule
// RMU2 and RMU3 are like RMU1, modulo renaming
module rmu2 = rmu1[rmu1_ctrl=rmu2_ctrl,biu1_rmu1=biu1_rmu2,
biu2_rmu1=biu2_rmu2,biu3_rmu1=biu3_rmu2]
endmodule
module rmu3 = rmu1[rmu1_ctrl=rmu3_ctrl,biu1_rmu1=biu1_rmu3,
biu2_rmu1=biu2_rmu3,biu3_rmu1=biu3_rmu3]
endmodule
// BIU2
module biu2
biu2_ctrl:[0..3] init 0;
// Wait for data from RMUS
[rmu_relay] (biu2_ctrl=0) -> (biu2_ctrl’=1);
// consume the messages + vote
[] (biu2_ctrl=1) -> (biu2_ctrl’=2) & (pe2_biu2’=vote2);
[biu2_send] (biu2_ctrl=2) -> (biu2_ctrl’=3);
// done
// [] (biu2_ctrl=3) -> (biu2_ctrl’=3);
endmodule
// BIU3: same as BIU2 modulo renaming
module biu3 = biu2[biu2_ctrl=biu3_ctrl,biu2_send=biu3_send,
biu2_rmu1=biu3_rmu1,biu2_rmu2=biu3_rmu2,
biu2_rmu3=biu3_rmu3,pe2_biu2=pe3_biu3]
endmodule
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// PE2
module pe2
pe2_ctrl: [0..2] init 0;
pe2_out: [0..7] init 0;
// wait for message from BIU2
[biu2_send] (pe2_ctrl=0) -> (pe2_ctrl’=1);
// consume the message
[] (pe2_ctrl=1) -> (pe2_ctrl’=2) & (pe2_out’ = pe2_biu2);
// done
// [] (pe2_ctrl=2) -> (pe2_ctrl’=2);
endmodule
// PE3: same as PE2 modulo renaming
module p3 = pe2[pe2_ctrl=pe3_ctrl,pe2_out=pe3_out,
biu2_send=biu3_send,pe2_biu2=pe3_biu3]
endmodule
label "done" = pe1_ctrl=4 & pe2_ctrl=2 & pe3_ctrl=2;
label "all_good" = (pe1_out=source) & (pe2_out=source) & (pe3_out=source);
label "unanimous" = (pe1_out=pe2_out) & (pe1_out=pe3_out);
label "nonfaulty_agree" = (pe2_out=pe3_out);
label "nonfaulty_valid" = (pe2_out=source) & (pe3_out=source);
Properties for this model
// The broadcast protocol terminates with probability 1.
"init"=>P>=1 [ F "done" ]
P>=1 [ G ("done"=>"all_good") ]
P>=1 [ G ("done"=>"unanimous") ]
Pmin =? [ G("done" => "unanimous") ]
Pmax =? [G("done" => "unanimous")]
Pmin =? [G ("done" => "nonfaulty_agree")]
Pmax =? [G ("done" => "nonfaulty_agree")]
Pmin =? [G ("done" => "nonfaulty_valid")]
Pmax =? [G ("done" => "nonfaulty_valid")]
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